

CHINA

CONSULTATION
1958

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FAR EASTERN OFFICE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

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FORWARD

In the spring of 1958, the Executive Committee of the China Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. felt that it would be well if representatives of the mission boards could sit down together for a fresh look at the China situation, both as concerns the Christian Church in China and the general and political situation. A program committee was appointed and on September 8-10, 1958, a China Policy Consultation was convened at Seabury House in Greenwich, Conn. Those present were basically members of the China Committee but a number of other church leaders with special interest were also present as well as a few active missionaries. 45 persons participated, including staff and speakers, and 29 agencies or organizations were represented.

It was agreed that there would be no attempt to arrive at a consensus of opinion regarding the current situation or possible future action, and that no statement or message would be formulated by the group. There was general agreement that it had been an enlightening experience and that the four major presentations were so comprehensive and helpful that they should be made available to as wide a group of our constituency as possible. In view of the valuable comment made by Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, it was felt that this should also be included in the booklet. The China Executive Committee subsequently voted that this office should proceed with publication of these statements in a booklet if orders from the boards and other interested agencies were sufficient to cover the expense.

Since no arrangements had been made to take down these presentations, it was necessary to ask those who had made them to work over their notes for use in this form, as well as to circularize the boards and agencies as to the number of copies that were needed. This accounts for the time lapse between the Consultation itself and the issuance of this booklet.

The China Committee and the Far Eastern Office are most grateful to the friends whose material has been incorporated in this booklet; for their kindness in making the presentations in the first place, taking time from extremely busy schedules to prepare this material for reproduction and for the excellent and illuminating material contained in their presentations.

*Wallace C. Merwin, Secretary, China Committee
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What Has Happened in State and Society in China Since 1949

A. Doak Barnett

There is one word in Chinese which, to me, best summarizes developments in Communist China during the past nine years. That word is "tou cheng" or "struggle." The Chinese Communists have been engaged, and are still engaged, in an immense struggle. It has not only been the members of the Communist Party in China who have been involved in this process of struggle. The Communists have organized and directed and manipulated the huge population of China in such a way that almost everyone has been intimately involved in a continuing revolutionary struggle which has affected almost every aspect of China's national life.

Communist China is a country in motion, on the move, a country in the process of changing, of developing. It is a country mobilized to fight. It is mobilized to fight against its past, against nature, and against all of the internal and external obstacles which exist to the achievement of the Chinese Communist leaders stated goal.

The leaders of Communist China believe that revolutionary progress as they define it requires struggle at every level of society and in all aspects of human behavior and human relations. It requires internal struggle within each individual against both traditional thought and modern Western thought, against a passive outlook on life and on politics, against individualism, idealism, and all non-Marxist beliefs and attitudes. It requires class struggle between the major social groups in China in order to change the social structure of the entire nation, to alter the basic characteristics of the peasants, the business class, and the intellectuals. It requires national struggle to develop China under Communist rule into a strong modern state. It requires international struggle to promote the worldwide revolutionary cause to which the Chinese Communist leaders are dedicated.

Communist China today presents a picture of over 640,000,000 human beings, organized, mobilized, and regimented to engage in perhaps the most tremendous political, economic, and social revolution in history. One recent European visitor to Communist China has described it as a land of "blue ants" – a land of orderly, drab, regimented, and tirelessly busy masses of people. His metaphor is an apt one.

The China of 1958 presents such startling contrasts to the confused, disunited, fragmented China of the recent past that it is extremely difficult, genuinely, to understand what is now taking place, even if one knows a good many so-called "facts" about recent developments. Sun Yat-sen once described China as a sheet of sand – lacking cohesion.

In nine years, this sheet of sand appears to have been converted into a slab of concrete — seemingly monolithic. How has this change taken place? This question defies easy, glib answers, but one is compelled to attempt to explain it.

The Impact of a Dynamic Totalitarianism

One of the basic explanations for the immense revolutionary changes in China during the past nine years must be sought in the power and dynamism of the modern totalitarian state. The Communist ability to impose upon China in a few short years an effective and seemingly almost omnipresent totalitarian state should give pause to believers in the democratic political system. In pre-1949 China, there appeared to be so many cultural traditions antithetical to totalitarian rule that few objective observers believed it would be possible for any totalitarian regime, however efficient, to impose complete and rigid control over Chinese society in a few short years. The fact that this has, apparently, been done leads one toward the disturbing conclusion that an effective Communist Party, if it is able to achieve military and political predominance, may be able to establish a monolithic totalitarian state in almost any society undergoing revolutionary change. The cultural traditions which we have thought would constitute basic obstacles to totalitarian rule in much of the underdeveloped world may not be as effective barriers to communism as we have believed.

In a sense, the ability of a handful of revolutionary leaders exercising totalitarian power to harness the energies of millions of human beings really adds a new, and in some respects alarming, dimension to concepts of political power. It may well have as much impact upon the history of our new-found ability to harness the physical energy trapped in the atom.

What have the Chinese Communists been able to accomplish politically with their totalitarian power during the past nine years? They have, first of all, restored for the most part the traditional Chinese Empire. They have also destroyed the political and military basis of the war lordism and provincial regionalism which plagued China throughout the modern period up until 1949. They have established a strong central government with the capacity and the will to make revolutionary decisions and then to implement them. And, finally, they have built a party-government-army-structure of power which has extended centralized control down to the level of the village and the individual in China in an unprecedented fashion.

The strength of the Chinese Communist political system rests on a number of basic elements. Most important of these is the Communist Party itself. According to official claims, there are 12.7 million men and women in the Chinese Communist Party, and in addition there are 23 million more in the young Communist League attached to the Party. The Chinese Communist Party is, therefore, the largest party organism

in the world. It is larger than some modern national states. It is a highly disciplined organization, and it is the center of all decision-making power at every level in China today. It controls the army and all of the other major instruments of force in the country. It controls the government and the many mass political organizations into which the whole Chinese populace has been grouped. Despite internal problems, it has demonstrated remarkable strength as a political organism.

Among the many explanations for the Chinese Communist Party's strength, one of the most important is the high degree of unity of leadership which it has maintained. Since the 1930's, there has only been one top-level purge within the Communist Party in China, and that purge, which took place during 1954-1955, appears not to have seriously weakened the party organization. Purges of a sort, however, have served an extremely important role in the maintenance of Party discipline. The Chinese Communists almost constantly conduct what they call "inner party struggle", a process of mutual criticism and indoctrination among Party members, and those who do not live up to the rigid standards of performance laid down by Party leaders are weeded out.

The Communist Party has complete control of military force in China. The army is, in fact, simply the military arm of the Party. It garrisons the country, and army units are located in key spots throughout the nation. Although it now, for the most part, stays in the background, it nonetheless is the ultimate sanction for the enforcement of the Party's authority.

Government in Communist China serves as the administrative arm of the Party. It is huge and bureaucratic, and in many respects inefficient. But there is no question that its mandate reaches to virtually every household in the country.

Perhaps the greatest political innovation under Communist rule in China, however, has been the mass organization of the population. Almost everyone in the country is now organized into political groups which are controlled by either the Party or Government and which educate, propagandize, exhort, and mobilize their members for activities of innumerable sorts. The average person in China finds himself deeply involved in a web of organizations which regulate almost every aspect of his life. He feels, as a result, under the constant scrutiny of the regime.

There seems to be little doubt that the Chinese Communists have been able to build up the strongest ruling apparatus in the history of China.

The political strength of the Chinese Communist regime does not mean however, that the present regime does not have serious problems. It does. Some of these are traditional political problems. Some are the inevitable product of totalitarian repression itself.

In many respects, these problems have come to light more in the past two or three years than ever before. During one month, in May-June of 1957, the Communists opened the valve of free expression in China and this relaxation of control brought forth a flood of criticism concerning almost every aspect of their regime. Non-Communist intellectuals and the leaders of so-called minor "parties" in China took the lead in this criticism, but many others, including students and peasants, also spoke against the regime. There is little doubt that all of this criticism surprised and disturbed the Chinese Communist leaders. After one short month, the valve of free expression was closed again and all the power of the regime was mobilized to counterattack against dissidence both within and without the Party in a massive "rectification" and "anti-rightist" campaign which lasted well into 1958. The regime quickly demonstrated its power and control once again.

Apart from the intellectuals, other groups in China have also shown increased signs of tension and dissatisfaction since 1956. Among the minority peoples in China's borderlands, local nationalism directed against centralized Chinese rule has come increasingly to the fore. In 1956-1957, there were also signs of peasant dissatisfaction with collectivization, even though there was little indication of effective organized opposition.

The Chinese Communists also face many political problems which almost all Chinese governments in the past have encountered. One of these, for example, is the almost inevitable conflict of strong central authority with localism and regionalism. During 1952-1956 the trend in Communist China was overwhelmingly towards increased centralization. Since 1956 there has been a trend in the other direction, towards greater decentralization. But it is difficult for the rulers of China to strike a balance.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that signs of tension and dissatisfaction have in themselves meant a basic weakening of the regime. In many respects, they are simply the inevitable product of tremendous revolutionary upheaval. And the bulk of available evidence indicates that the Chinese Communist regime today faces the outside world from a domestic position of political strength.

During 1958 Communist China embarked on a new program, designed to organize rural China — and ultimately much of urban China — into so-called communes. This program is certainly the most radical and far-reaching attempt ever made by any modern state to change completely the character of society. In some respects, this program is the biggest gamble which the Chinese Communists have taken. The comunization program strikes at the very roots of Chinese society, including the family, and conceivably it could, in time, evoke stronger popular opposition than anything the Chinese Communists have attempted

to date. However, so far, there is no indication that the Chinese population has been able effectively to protest even this drastic move. And the decision of Communist China's leaders to embark upon the program appears to demonstrate once again their own confidence in their almost absolute political power. Unless and until there is some internal corrosion or break-up within the Chinese Communists' political and military apparatus it is difficult to conceive of effective organized opposition developing against the regime.

Mass Movement An Aid To Total Control

Perhaps the best evidence of the Chinese Communist monopoly of power — as well as one of the major causes of discontent in China — has been the series of mass campaigns which have periodically convulsed the nation since 1949. Each of these campaigns has not only strengthened Communist control but has also moved China steadily towards the Communist goal of a society under total state control.

In many respects the history of China during the last nine years can be summarized in the history of the Communist regime's major mass campaigns. Each of the campaigns has been an "intense struggle" and each has had far-reaching political, economic, and social results.

During the period from 1949 through 1952, the Chinese Communists carried out their so-called "agrarian reform." This was a program of land redistribution, preliminary to collectivization, in which the Chinese Communists not only destroyed China's landlord class, but also, through a process of intense class struggle, basically changed the social structure in China's tens of thousands of villages. Several million landlords were killed in the process.

In 1951-1952 and again in 1955 Communist China was convulsed by campaigns against counterrevolutionaries. In the first of these periods, in particular, China was gripped by what can only be called a violent reign of terror. Several hundreds of thousands of persons were accused of anti-state activity in these campaigns. And the campaigns created an atmosphere of fear and produced attitudes of submission which extended far beyond those directly accused of anti-state activity. The three-anti and five-anti campaigns also took place during this same period. In these two campaigns the Chinese Communists simultaneously purged their own Party and attacked the whole business class of China, accusing businessmen of attempting to corrupt and subvert the regime.

Another campaign conducted during the Korean War period was the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign. By accusing the United States of trying to invade China, the Chinese Communists made every attempt to arouse intense nationalism and anti-Western feeling.

Collectivization took place in China during a tremendous drive in 1955-1956. This seemed, at the time, to be perhaps the greatest feat of

social engineering in history. Almost a half-billion people who for two millenia had known only small-scale individual farming were in a few short months herded into collective organizations which changed their entire way of life. Socialization of private industry and commerce went on at the same time.

The campaign to organize communes which the Communists have conducted during 1958 makes even the collectivization campaign look relatively unimportant, however. In a few short months during 1958, the Chinese Communists claim almost three-quarters of a million collectives have been merged into about twenty-five thousand communes, which go far beyond any attempt at social reorganization yet tried in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. These communes may, in many respects, still be paper organizations, but the Chinese Communists have clearly defined what the communes are ultimately to be, and they claim to have made rapid progress already toward these ultimate aims.

Each commune is to be a large-scale organization combining economic, political, and military functions. Although their size will vary, in most places they will contain between five thousand and ten thousand families. The leadership of a commune, which will also constitute the local government in any particular area, will have absolute control over the labor and lives of all the commune members. Members will be assigned agricultural or industrial work by the commune leaders. All property of any consequence — including the houses, fruit trees, animals, and private plots of land which the peasants were able to retain under collectivization — will be turned over to the communes. Commune members will be paid wages.

These political and economic aspects of the communes are remarkable enough in themselves. But the social aims of the communes are even more startling. The Chinese Communists say that they hope to organize the members of a commune into communal messes, eliminating private dining. They hope to place all the children into communal nurseries, which ultimately, they say, are to be full-time boarding institutions. They also expect in many places actually to tear down the individual homes of peasants and to replace them with barracks-like buildings where members of the commune will live communally. Already thousands of mess halls and nurseries have been established in China, and there have been some experiments with segregated barracks.

If the Chinese Communists are able to carry this program through successfully, China, although still only beginning to catch up with the modern world in a technical sense, will have come very close to George Orwell's "1984" in an institutional sense.

There is no easy way to summarize the results of all of these campaigns. The results are very extensive. They appear to have basically undermined the foundations of traditional Chinese society, and without

doubt they have made an imprint upon it which will be permanent — however long the Chinese Communist regime may last. They have deprived one group after another of its previous moral, psychological, economic, and political basis for independent influence or action. They have completely reorganized the institutional basis of Chinese society. They have resulted in a drastic economic levelling process and have redistributed the wealth of the country. They have brought entirely new groups into positions of power and leadership throughout China, not only in the realm of politics but in all important social institutions. They have involved the masses of the Chinese people in national life — and in activity for national rather than local or personal goals — to an unprecedented extent. They have introduced through conscious thought control and indoctrination, a whole new set of values, a new state ideology, and new approved norms of behavior and thought.

It is extraordinary how much attention the Chinese Communists devote not only to what people do but also to what people think. Without doubt ideology is the basic cement which hold together the ruling group and which, to a large degree, explains its unity and its dynamism. But the Chinese Communists appear determined not only to maintain “the faith” within the Party itself. They also are attempting to indoctrinate the whole population in the new ideology. Many visitors to both the Soviet Union and Communist China have been struck by the great difference between the two countries in this respect. After forty years of bureaucratic ossification, the Soviet leaders do not show the same zeal as the Chinese in attempting to indoctrinate the individual.

In China there is an intense, religious, revivalist flavor about much that the Chinese Communists do. Their basic approach to opposition and dissidence is to attempt to indoctrinate and “remold” the persons involved, rather than simply to eliminate them in a physical sense. They show the determination of fanatics in trying to obtain not only simple acquiescence to their rule but positive conversion to their beliefs. The whole educational system in China, which has been vastly expanded, and the huge propaganda apparatus, which extends everywhere, hammer new ideas and values into the population constantly. In addition, a large part of the population in China, especially in urban areas, is organized into so-called “hsueh hsi” groups, or “study groups”, to learn by rote a new and unfamiliar version of what is defined to be the truth. In all of this indoctrination the Chinese Communists concern themselves not only with day to day matters but also with basic values and attitudes.

It is difficult, of course, to know what the real effect of the indoctrination is upon people's thinking. It is clear that many people, particularly among the older generation, verbally submit to authority while maintaining their own previous views and attitudes privately. There is no question, however, that indoctrination in Communist China is Successful in

achieving general conformity on the surface, and it seems probable that it is having a great impact upon the values and attitudes of the younger generation in particular. A whole generation is being "molded" with Marxist ideas, with new concepts about the nature of society and history; the criteria for defining "good" and "bad", the rules which should govern human relations; and the norms governing relations between man and society and man and nature.

When criticized for their fanaticism or intolerance, the Chinese Communists point to the continuing existence of several minor "parties" and religious organizations in China. But such groups are still tolerated merely because this is now considered tactically expedient. The attitude of the Chinese Communists toward all groups that do not fit completely into their overall scheme of things can probably best be summarized, in fact, by the slogan with which they describe their policies toward the Chinese business class: "to use, to restrict, and to transform." This three-word slogan is a good summary of their policies toward non-Communist groups. The regime certainly does restrict and attempt to use not only organized businessmen but all similar groups, and it also appears to be confident that in due time these groups can all be transformed and integrated into a socialist or communist society.

All great revolutionary upheavals are both destructive and constructive. The Chinese revolution during the past nine years has certainly been destructive in innumerable ways. It has torn apart the fabric of traditional Chinese society and undermined time-tested traditional values. At the same time, however, it has also released, and directed into controlled channels, an enormous amount of energy. It has stimulated tremendous constructive activity. This has been particularly evident in the field of economic development, and it is the Chinese Communists' success in initiating a rapid rate of economic growth, building up modern industry, and developing national power during the past nine years, which has, probably more than anything else, impressed sympathetic outside observers, particularly those from other Asian countries.

Economic Development

The Chinese Communists are determined to industrialize and to catch up with the more advanced modern nations economically, and in a sense economic development has been the main focus of energy and activity within China since the first Five-Year Plan was started in 1953.

The Chinese Communists have faced many problems, and have made many costly mistakes, in their economic development, but they have nonetheless made impressive progress in the Stalinist, power-oriented program which they have initiated. The principal symbol of this progress has been the thousand of new factories which have gone up in

China, not only in coastal regions of the country, but all over the interior, in new industrial centers throughout northeast, north, northwest, and southwest China.

At the end of 1957, the Chinese Communists in summarizing their claims regarding accomplishments during their first Five-Year Plan, asserted that during 1953-1957 they had roughly doubled the value of gross industrial output in China, increased gross agricultural output by about one-quarter and increased gross agricultural-industrial output by roughly one half. They also claimed to have increased national income by almost one-half during the same period, at the rate of about nine per cent per year.

Chinese Communist statistics are peculiarly difficult to evaluate. If more objective and complete information were available, many of their claims would have to be downgraded. Studies made in the U.S., for example, indicate that the rate of national income growth in China during 1953-1957 may have been somewhere between six and eight per cent rather than the nine per cent figure officially claimed. But even if the official figures are discounted, it is clear that Communist China has developed at a faster rate during the past five years than any other major underdeveloped country.

At the end of 1957 the Chinese Communists announced preliminary plans for their second Five-Year Plan, covering 1958 through 1962, which projected a rate of progress similar to that in their first Plan. As they started their second Plan, however, they faced numerous basic problems; the shortage of land and the tendency of agriculture to lag behind industrial developments, the explosive growth of populations and many others. The population problem is one which particularly baffles outside observers. As of mid-1957 it was officially estimated that Communist China's population was 634,000,000. The population was said to have increased during the first Plan period by almost 65,000,000 people, a figure larger than the total population of most countries. And the current rate of population growth is estimated to be over two per cent. If this rate continues, by the 1980's or thereabouts Communist China will have a population of about 1,000,000,000. It is difficult to conceive of how this will be possible.

Despite these and other basic problems, however, the Chinese Communists have demonstrated that they can make progress, despite great difficulties, and it seems probable that in the years immediately ahead, at least, they will be able to continue doing so. In early 1958, in fact, they announced what they called a "great leap forward" in their economic development, and their subsequent claims concerning economic accomplishments during the year have been almost fantastic. Proclaiming to the Chinese people that China should surpass Britain in the output of steel and other basic heavy industries in the course of three

Five-Year Plans, or by 1972, the Chinese Communists have proceeded to mobilize the labor force in China to an almost unbelievable degree, to construct massive new irrigation works and innumerable small-scale industries, as well as the large-scale heavy industries which have been the main focus of the economic program in China ever since the first Five-Year Plan was started. They now claim that before the end of 1958 they will have doubled the output of both grain and of steel as compared with 1957. These claims defy belief. No other country in history has developed at a pace even close to the one which these claims would imply, and objective observers believe that many of the Chinese Communists recent claims must grossly exaggerate the truth. Yet, there is no doubt that during 1958 the Chinese Communists have made rapid and impressive progress in expanding both agricultural and industrial production. It is not impossible that by 1972 Communist China's output of many basic industries may exceed (in absolute terms, but not on a per capita basis) that of Great Britain.

This whole economic program to date, however, has not resulted in any significant rise in living standards in China. It has been a program based upon enforced austerity, and the basic necessities in China have rigidly rationed. Nor is there any certainty that living standards will rise appreciably or significantly in the years immediately ahead. The basic reason for this is the fact that the Chinese Communists have modelled their program on the Stalinist pattern. It is a program, therefore, that involves concentration not upon consumer goods but upon heavy industry — upon steel and metals, mining, the manufacture of machine tools, and other engineering industries which provide a basis for national power. These industries produce machines to produce more machines to produce more machines. They also produce the materiel necessary for modern military power. But they do not, in themselves, contribute directly to a rising standard of living.

In effect, the population in China is being asked to work harder and harder for national rather than personal goals, and for the future rather than personal goals, and for the future rather than for the present. A few small groups in the country, and industrial labor in particular, may have improved their living standard somewhat in recent years. But there are other large groups who have been impoverished by the economic leveling process which has taken place under Communist rule. By rationing basic necessities to everyone in the country, these China Communists have insured distribution of a minimum supply of necessities to most of the population. But the need for austerities have been constantly impressed upon the whole population. And living standards in general have been kept close to the minimum level.

Despite the lack of substantial welfare improvement, however, Communist China's rapid rate of economic growth is certainly one of the

facts of major importance in the world in the mid-twentieth century. The Chinese Communists appear to be demonstrating that the Soviet approach to economic development can be successfully applied — if political leaders are willing to pay an enormous price in terms of political freedom and the welfare of the individual — even in overpopulated, underdeveloped Asian countries. The price of this development is excessive to those who believe in the values of liberal democracy, but there are not a few Asians, discouraged by their own lack of economic progress, who seem to be more impressed by what the Chinese Communists have achieved than by the costs which their achievements have involved. It is difficult to calculate what the long run effects of this fact will be in Asia. Unless other Asian countries are able to show greater achievements than heretofore, and make more rapid progress in their own economic development by democratic rather than totalitarian methods, the impact of Communist China's economic development may prove to be one of the most powerful anti-democratic forces at work in the underdeveloped world.

Growing Influence on World Affairs

In innumerable respects the growing influence of Communist China on Asian affairs has been one of the most significant and unsettling international developments during the past decade. Until at least 1952, it is true, Communist China was largely isolated from the non-Communist world. This was to a considerable degree a result of the Korean War as well as the Chinese Communists own policies. But since then, the Chinese Communists have steadily expanded their political, cultural, and economic contacts and influence with a very large range of countries. Attempts to isolate or quarantine them have been far from completely successful.

Since 1952, Communist China has energetically promoted what it calls "peoples diplomacy" all over the world — developing exchanges of people, and trade and other economic contacts, with countries of many different political colorations. Since 1954, it has made every effort to expand its diplomatic contacts, with considerable success. Since 1956, it has also initiated a number of small economic aid programs to several non-Communist Asian countries, concentrating on the small neutralist countries, such as Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt and Yemen.

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communists have ambitious international aims. Chinese tradition, modern nationalism, and Communist ideology all reinforce their determination to establish China's position as a major world power. In addition, there is little doubt about the dedication of Communist China's leaders to the promotion of world revolution. In all probability, it is the Chinese rather than the Russians who today are the most zealous missionaries for communism in an ideological sense.

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the importance of the ideological aspects of the Chinese Communists' motivation in their relations with the rest of the world. Their determination to promote world revolution, plus the fact that much of Asia now consists of new and unstable nations grappling with tremendous internal problems, poses some of the most challenging long-range problems now facing the United States in its foreign policy.

There is a tendency among some Americans to regard the Chinese Communist regime primarily in terms of a military threat. There is no doubt that the Chinese Communists' growing military power does create basic security problems for the United States and other non-Communist nations. But it is a serious error to view the total Chinese Communist challenge primarily in military terms.

To a degree, it is possible to differentiate between what the Chinese Communists regard as the national interests in a traditional sense — matters concerning their own territorial claims and military security and national prestige — and their long-range revolutionary aims.

To achieve the first category of aims, the Chinese Communists now appear willing to use overt military force and almost any other means that it can to accomplish its purposes — even though there are good reasons to believe that they wish to avoid a major war. During the past year, they have become increasingly bellicose in their posture toward the United States and its allies, and they appear to be willing to try their own brand of brinkmanship.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because of this the Chinese Communists are thinking in primarily military terms about their long-range revolutionary aspirations and their approach to other areas of the world. The idea of world revolution in the Communist sense is very different from the traditional military idea of world conquest. The Chinese Communists view the world as a whole as being involved in a process in which great social, economic, and political forces are at work. They appear confident that these forces, and what Mao Tse-tung calls the "wheel of history", are moving steadily and inexorably in the direction of their goals. "The East wind prevails over the West wind," Mao Tse-tung now proclaims. Communist China's long-range revolutionary policy, and its approach to the crucial underdeveloped areas of the world, appear to be based upon the idea that through economic competition, political maneuver, and revolutionary subversion, China will be able to encourage, assist, and promote these worldwide forces so that they will ultimately triumph.

Since about 1954, both the Chinese Communists and the Russians appear to have focused their primary attention upon the uncommitted, underdeveloped nations of the world. In their approach toward these nations,

they have followed a line of "peaceful co-existence." They have attempted to develop many kinds of political and economic contacts, and to cultivate close and friendly relations with the countries of many different political colorations. And they have given strong backing to every manifestation of neutralism, anti-colonialism, and nationalism anywhere in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

The revolutionary challenge of the Sino-Soviet bloc is one which is very different, therefore, and, in many respects much more difficult, than a purely military challenge. It is a challenge which demands from the United States greater understanding of the moving forces which are at work in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America — the spiritual, social, and economic, as well as the political and military, forces. It is a challenge which demands a willingness on the part of the United States to commit its own material and spiritual resources to a far greater extent than is currently the case to the whole process of development of the nations and people in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Communist China is without doubt one of the most dynamic forces at work in the world today. The Chinese Communist leaders are not only attempting to change the whole pattern of life within China, where one-quarter of the human race lives. They are also actively and energetically attempting to influence the entire course of history, particularly in the non-Western world. We must realistically face, therefore, not only the question of what we can or cannot do in respect to Communist China itself, but also the question of whether or not we are capable of competing effectively with Communist China, and with the ideas, the values, and the institutions which it represents, in the whole non-Western, Asian-African world.

The Churches of China Since 1949

Francis P. Jones

In 1949, when the Communists came to power in China, the various Protestant churches there had a membership totaling about a million. This young church now found itself obliged to live under a government professedly hostile to all religion. This, of course, was not an unprecedented experience for a Christian church. Even the specific problem of living under Communism had previously been faced in Russia by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Baptist Church, and by the various Lutheran and Reformed churches of the satellite countries of Europe since World War II. But those were all old established churches, with many centuries of tradition behind them. This experience in China was the first time that one of the younger churches, the result of the Protestant missionary movement of the past century and a half, had been placed in such a difficult position.

Almost immediately this young church was subjected to a series of shocks that might well have overwhelmed it completely. The first of these was the enforced departure of all missionaries. These had furnished education and guidance to the young church, bringing to it the accumulated experience of the centuries from the churches of Europe and America. Now they all departed. Some had left before the Communists came to power in 1949, the great majority left during the years 1949 to 1951, and the few that were left after the spring of 1951 found themselves cut off from the church program and obliged to sit in galling inactivity while waiting for permission to leave for home.

This shock was a comparatively minor one. Most of the churches had had to get along without missionary help for years during the war with Japan. Moreover, the missionaries had done their work well enough, so that by this time there was a very considerable number of well-trained and competent Chinese leaders ready to take over any of the direction of the work which had formerly been in the hands of missionaries. Indeed, much of that transfer had already taken place, and the missionaries were already in the position of more or less dispensable advisors and resource men.

A more formidable shock was the complete cutting off of funds from abroad. The American Government took action in December 1950, freezing the transfer of all funds to Communist China, and the Communist Government took this opportunity, by way of retaliation, to forbid any church or philanthropic organization anywhere in China from receiving funds from abroad. This was a more sudden and drastic move than had been expected. The churches had already been alerted to the necessity

of sloughing off all financial connections with the West, and particularly with America, but it was understood that this was to be a gradual process, to give the church a chance to adjust.

This situation was one which missionary policy itself had helped to produce. The church had been given an elaborate organization, on Western patterns, beyond the ability of the small and scattered groups of Chinese Christians to support. This had been done, not as the Chinese now charge, with the specific purpose of keeping the Chinese Church in tutelage, but from a realization that Chinese Christians were face to face with such an immense problem of reaching the unevangelized that they should be supplied with resources from the older churches to help them accomplish the task. In normal times this might be good reasoning but the result in China now was to enormously complicate the task of the church in adapting its whole program to its greatly reduced financial resources. The burden of this was not spread evenly throughout the whole church structure, but bore more heavily upon some aspects than upon others. Pastors, except those in the smaller country churches, were fairly well provided for from local income, but the higher one proceeded in the "hierarchy" up to district superintendents and bishops, the more customary it had been to depend upon foreign funds for support. Of the institutions connected with the church, schools and hospitals which were able to count on a considerable proportion of local support were taken over by the new regime, and only the theological schools, which had depended almost entirely upon foreign support, were left to the churches.

A third shock, of a still more fundamental sort, might be called the moral challenge of Communism. Before the actual establishment of the Communist regime, Christian pastors, influenced partly by the brutal excesses of Communist armies in earlier years, and partly by the prevailing attitude of the West, with which they were in contact through the missionaries, had been accustomed to look upon the Communists as people of low moral character with an unbridled lust for power and no regard for the rights of other people. They were accordingly amazed to find them a party with a highly developed moral sense and a deep sense of dedication, which led them to self-sacrifice and self-discipline of so thorough-going a nature as to shame the Christians who had formerly thought of themselves as the only ones in China willing to sacrifice for their ideals. The shock of this realization was devastating. It suggested the fundamental doubt of why Christianity or any religion should be necessary at all, when a non-religious ideology had shown itself capable of generating such public-spiritedness and unselfishness.

A final shock might be described as the eroding effect of living day after day under the power of an openly hostile government. This government had set itself to regiment not only the political life, but also the

economic life of China, and indeed every aspect of its culture. It was readily apparent, therefore, that anyone who held on to any religious ideas would be under a definite handicap in the new regime.

The result was a fairly wide-spread apostasy from the faith of all those whose faith was not deep enough to stand these shocks. It is estimated that the Protestant membership in China dropped from about a million in 1949 to not more than 600,000 in 1952. Since then the number has been slowly going up, and the latest estimate by Christian leaders in China sets the number of Protestant Christians there as about 700,000.

Life has been difficult for these Christians. They have been harassed and discriminated against in both official and unofficial ways. It is perhaps the unofficial discrimination that is the hardest to endure and combat. Just because it is unofficial, it can be officially denied, and in fact the Christian leaders who are spokesmen for the new regime do stoutly deny, or at least minimize, the existence of any widespread discrimination against Christians. But the stories have multiplied of Christian students not allowed to continue studies, Christian nurses in hospitals being assigned to the most menial and distasteful duties, and humiliations heaped upon pastors just because they are pastors. When one pastor in Shanghai showed up at the police station to register his residence and stated his occupation as "Christian pastor", the police official ostentatiously wrote down "Dealer in superstition."

The official hampering of church life is very widespread, and almost impossible to imagine by those who have always lived under a government which respects the establishment of religion. During the period of land redistribution 1951-53, all country churches were officially closed. It is true that the government order was not directed exclusively at churches, but forbade, in general, all meetings in the villages, lest they be used as a basis for counter-revolutionary activity against the government. On that ground Christian leaders could look upon this restriction as not being anti-Christian discrimination, and therefore accept it as a patriotic duty. However, today, five years after the land redistribution program came to an end, many of those country churches have still not been allowed to reopen, and this year many of the finest Christian leaders have been condemned as rightists because they have dared to protest against the high-handed attitude of the government in keeping these country churches closed.

The district and national meetings by which a church is able to maintain its corporate life have been similarly hampered. Special permission to hold these meetings must always be obtained in advance, and it is by no means easy to get. Just what the conditions laid down by the government are is not very clear, but they are certainly connected with the way in which the leaders of that area or that denomination have co-

operated with the Communist regime. Of the ten Methodist Annual Conferences in China, two or three have been able to hold, at the most, three sessions since the Communists came to power; of the others it is not known that a single Conference session has been held. Similarly there has been no meeting of the Methodist Central Conference, national in scope, since 1947, although it is supposed to be held every four years.

The Communist Government's control of the life of every citizen in Red China is so complete that it is difficult to find time for church activities. Students, teachers, peasants, factory workers, and all the various occupational guilds are constantly being called to meetings, many of which conflict, and quite possibly deliberately, with the regular hours for church services, Sunday school, etc. And these meetings under Communist auspices are in the nature of command performances, — a Christian would not dare to disregard them, just in order to go to church. Such a situation, continued year after year, can not but have an eroding effect upon Christian devotion.

The corporate life of many of the churches of China has been still further disturbed by the ruthless arrest and imprisonment of many of their leaders. Methodist Bishop W. Y. Chen, Anglican Bishop Kimber Den, China Bible House Secretary Baen Lee, the founders of such indigenous sects as the Little Flock and the Jesus Family, and such popular preachers as Wang Ming-tao in Peking, have all served prison sentences, and some of them are still in prison. None of those released from prison has been able to resume his former work. The anti-rightist campaign in the spring of 1958 must have been very disrupting to church work. In Hunan the three major churches are the Church of Christ in China, the Lutheran Church, and the Methodist (British), and the outstanding preacher in each of these churches was condemned as a rightist during the past year and dismissed from his post.

The Communist system adds another difficulty to church life in the fact that the new economic system makes church support very difficult. With the progressive nationalization of all individual assets, the amount of this world's goods at the disposal of an individual Christian to devote to church support is steadily getting less, and the latest development, the organization of communes, would seem to take away from individuals altogether the economic ability to support a voluntary organization. And indeed the present demand is that every pastor support himself by manual labor, and he is being ridiculed as a parasite if he does not make his contribution to the economic building up of the country.

In spite of all these difficulties the church has continued. In the cities most of the churches have been able to hold services without interruption, and, especially since 1952, the number of baptisms shows

that the aggressive evangelistic zeal of the church has not diminished. The fearful ones who gave up their privileges as church members and sons of God in the early years of the Red regime are being replaced by more stalwart characters who dare, under the conditions described above, to accept baptism and take upon themselves the unpopular name of Christian.

This condition has been at least partly due to the emergence of a new organization known as the Three Self (self-support, self-government, and self-propagation) Patriotic Movement. This was organized in 1950, with a National Secretary of the Y.M.C.A., Y.T. Wu, as its leader. The founders of this movement realized that the Christian Church in China was doomed unless it should make a very sincere attempt to adapt itself, as far as consistent with its own teachings, to the requirements of the new regime. "As far as consistent" — those are the crucial words in that sentence, and many feel that this Movement has gone farther than is consistent with Christian ideals, so that its leaders no longer have the right to speak for the Christian church, or to be recognized as Christians.

How far have they gone? Very far indeed. The Three Self Movement, which is national in scope, and thus has practically displaced the National Christian Council as the spokesman for united Protestantism in China, has led the church down a road of hatred and intolerance, as it has taught the church to parrot the Communist line in an indiscriminating tirade against imperialism and colonialism, and against the whole missionary enterprise as a prime example of those two evils. They have docilely accepted orders from the Religious Affairs Bureau of the government, and denounced as a reactionary any of their fellow-pastors whom the Red regime had decided to liquidate. In all of the flood of denunciatory literature which they have put out in these eight years, there is not the slightest indication that Y. T. Wu and his colleagues have ever dared to question the truth or the authenticity of any statement or demand from the Communist Government.

On the other hand we must not forget the Government they are dealing with is so much more ruthless than anything we know, that they may well be perfectly sincere in feeling that the only way to maintain the mere existence of the church is by a radical acceptance of the Communist way of life. An occasional hint of this point of view comes out in their arguments, when, after having presented all the positive arguments they can find for their program, they add the significant admission that apart from this program the church has no future in China.

That the Christian leaders in China today have by following the Communist line seriously compromised the Christian principles of truth and love, of that there can be no doubt. But if we ask the further question, has that surrender to Communist lies and to hatred and intolerance

proceeded to the point that these Christian leaders are no longer worthy to be called Christian and to speak for the Christian Church in China, the answer will not be so clear. The Church throughout the ages, and including our Western Church today, has always been a checkered mixture of black and white, with unworthy sins defiling but not wholly negating the revelation of God with which she has been entrusted. Thus far at least I think we can still recognize the Church in China as an integral part of the ecumenical Church.

That ecumenical fellowship is however in decided eclipse. When the World Council of Churches was organized in Amsterdam in 1948, Prof. T. C. Chao of Yenching School of Religion was made one of the presidents. In 1950 he formally resigned in protest against the Council's critical attitude toward Communism. Chinese Christian leaders today hold aloof from the World Council of Churches, considering it a tool of western imperialism. Their attitude toward the International Missionary Council is one of still more decided opposition.

Anglican Bishop K. H. Ting attended a preparatory meeting for the Lambeth Conference in London in the summer of 1956, but no Chinese bishop attended the Lambeth Conference itself in the summer of 1958. Among other denominations there has not even been that tentative recognition of continuing relationships.

As recently as February 24 of this year (1958) Y.M.C.A. Secretary Kiang Wen-han published in the Tien Feng magazine a tirade against ecumenical church organizations under the title "How Imperialism Uses the Christian Church." He says, "All international church organizations are in finances, personnel and policy under the control of imperialism, and therefore they oppose Russia and Communism, and are hostile to the New China." He speaks of Dr. Mackay's proposal that a team of American Christians should visit the Chinese Church, and finds in it a sinister plot of American imperialists who hope in this way to make contact with reactionary Chinese Christians and thus subvert the New China from within. It is obvious that as long as this psychology prevails in China ecumenical relations will continue to be very strained.

The picture presented thus far is a very disheartening one, but there are also more favorable considerations which we should bear in mind. First of all the very continuance of the Christian Church itself should be a matter for heartfelt thanksgiving. More than one regional church has been wiped out during the centuries of Christian history by a hostile regime, and the continuing vitality of the Christian Church in China is a heartening indication that the Church has deep roots in the lives of its members. Still more, the new accessions in membership are particularly indicative of vitality. One issue of Tien Feng, a bi-weekly magazine, tells in one page of church news of various baptismal services that total more than 800 baptisms. That was exceptional

but every issue records such services, with the totals often running into the hundreds. When one considers what it must cost these new recruits to take upon themselves the cross of Christ, it is evident that there is still a very effective proclaiming of the Christian gospel in China.

This gospel, through undoubtedly watered down in some of its applications, is still being preached with a purity and a boldness that is often surprising. Some years ago the leader of the Three Self Movement, Y. T. Wu, had a series of articles in Tien Feng, written with the purpose of encouraging Christians to continue to bear witness to the gospel of Christ. One of his paragraphs is especially worth quoting. He said, "Occasionally I hear some discouraged Christian say, 'What future has the Christian religion in the New China anyway?' That is a strange question to be on the lips of a professing Christian. What has happened to his faith? Can he believe that the God who created heaven and earth, and upholds all things by the word of His power, has worked until today and tomorrow will suddenly stop working? Has he forgotten that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever? Can he believe that the Holy Spirit which has worked in men's hearts to produce conviction of sin and turn them to Christ, has worked until today and tomorrow will work no more in men's hearts? No, the eternal Triune God does not change with the times. It is not the power of God, but our own faithfulness that we need to be concerned about."

Anglican Bishop K. H. Ting is another outspoken protagonist for the new regime. He is now bishop of Chekiang province and also President of Nanking Union Theological Seminary. In the Nanking Seminary Review for August 1957 he published an article on Christian Theism, in which the Christian position as against Communist atheism was stated with extreme boldness. With great skill he answers the various Communist arguments against a belief in God, and then even ventures to turn their criticism upon themselves. After answering the Communist charge that religious belief is an opiate, he makes the counter-charge that atheism itself is an opiate. Adam, when he had sinned, hid from God and would have been glad to believe then that God did not exist. Peter said to Christ, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man." And down through the ages, man in his sin has turned to atheism as an opiate, trying thereby to drug the reproaches of his own conscience.

"Where the Word of God is preached and the Sacraments of Christ administered, there is the church." That was the criterion of the sixteenth century Reformers, and according to that criterion the Christian church is alive and strong in China today.

*Political Issues
Between Mainland China
and the United States*

C. Martin Wilbur

The subject I have been asked to discuss is of great import. The manner in which the people of the United States face up to the problems which confront us because of the rise of a communist state in China, and the longrange policy which our government implements toward China, will deeply affect not only our own lives and those of our children, but all of mankind. We face a struggle whose outcome no one can foretell. I hope we can view the subject objectively.

First, I should like to quote two of my colleagues, each an outstanding specialist on China at a great American university. Professor George Taylor, Director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute at the University of Washington, discussed China policy in *The Atlantic* for August, 1958, under the title "Why We Do Not Recognize Red China." I quote the first and last paragraphs which put his case succinctly:

The events of the last few years have shown the general soundness of our policy in Asia, especially toward Red China. In brief, we have provided sufficient military power in Asia to discourage overt Communist military adventures and thus permit the new nations to remain independent; we have backed this up with an intricate system of political and military alliances to indicate that our intentions are serious as well as honorable; we have given economic and technical assistance to both neutrals and allies in order to nourish their independence. As a result we have forced upon Red China and the whole Soviet bloc a change in their approach and a revision of their methods.

It is going to be difficult enough to prevent the Soviet bloc from sabotaging our economic aid, throwing out of balance the economic planning of our allies and the neutrals, infiltrating the parliamentary process in young democracies, and creating trouble for our military establishments. To aid the Communists by changing our policy toward Red China would be to court disaster.

Professor John King Fairbank of Harvard in the final section of his book² *The United States and China* discusses "Our China Policy in the Light of its Failure." I quote from his closing paragraphs:

Excerpts from *Why We Do Not Recognize Red China*, by Professor George Taylor reprinted by permission from *The Atlantic Monthly*.

²

Excerpts from John King Fairbanks — *The United States and China* reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

Our thinking, in conservative America, has not kept pace with China's revolution. The first reaction of many Americans, suddenly confronted by a China strong, chauvinist, and anti-Western (instead of weak and pro-American) was to seize upon international Communism as the explanation and attribute our reverse to Kremlin plots and State Department treachery. Some held that the Communist takeover was not a "real" revolution but a contrived one. Senators agreed that we should never have "permitted" it. A few still speak of our "loss" of China.

This loss, I suggest has been chiefly in our heads. For this latest phase of China's long history . . . has called into question our own view of ourselves and our place in the world process . . .

If it be true, as I am suggesting, that our emotional reaction to the rise of Chinese Communism has been an attempted rejection of reality, the reasons for this escapism are not far to seek. Insofar as the missionary conversion and general uplift of the Chinese people expressed our conviction that we led the march of human progress, our self-confidence has been dealt a grievous blow. One fourth of mankind in China have spurned not only Christianity but also town-meeting democracy, the supremacy of law, the ideals of individualism, the multi-party election process, civil liberties and the self-determination of peoples, indeed, our entire political order and its concepts of freedom and security through due process. How can we not feel our basic values directly menaced?

One consolation in this crisis, therefore, is to think that the Chinese Communist dictatorship, . . . maintains itself only by force and manipulation, that . . . it is too evil to last . . .

Such, I fear, is not the case. Peking's collapse is always a possibility but at present . . . we have little reason to think it probable . . . Clutching at this straw will not help us.

In short, we have to face it . . .

Living in the same world with a nationalistic, overpopulated, poverty-stricken Communist-managed China may become a challenge that will make or break us. The new phase of our relations will demand hard study, emotional maturity, skilled personnel. These call for an effort by American citizens, not merely by the United States Government.

. . . History does not warrant our taking any estimate as final. But the challenge is plain: the century during which the Chinese had to learn to live in our Western world is past. Now we both have to learn to live on the same planet.

Present and Future Relations With China

The diversity of these views is wide enough to give me pause as I set down my own views on our present and possible future relations with China. On the basis of the excellent summaries by Doak Barnett and Francis Jones of what has happened in mainland China in the past nine years let us project our thinking forward to the next decade or so. On the assumption that there is no world war, it seems likely that the

following things will happen in China. The population will grow to around 800 million. This will create great internal pressures as well as pressures on Southeast Asia, Inner Asia and Siberia. China's national production will increase greatly. Her farms and factories will produce a volume of goods that will provide the substance of power in Asia, even though in its industrial economy China will still be behind America, Russia and Western Europe. Society will be modernized in many aspects as a result of the effective application of science and technology. The people will be unified, disciplined, centrally controlled and infused with a nationalistic and revolutionary ideology. The technically educated part of the population will be much greater than now and the education will be of high quality. China may even contribute its share to scientific advances in atomic energy and exploration of outer space. China will be a great military power compared with all its Asian neighbors.

Given the Middle Kingdom tradition, nationalism, and the ideology of world revolution, together with the dynamism coming from internal economic and social developments, China is bound to exert greater and greater influence on its neighbors, including Russia, and on the entire world. Is the policy of the United States towards China realistic and suitable to this emerging situation? What are the issues which divide the United States and mainland China and how should we deal with them?

American policy in Asia and towards the Chinese People's Republic is part of a larger, more fundamental policy of maintaining our national security, strengthening the Free World, and attempting to stop the expansion of Communism. The issues between America and Red China arise from a clash of two power systems and two antagonistic philosophies. The deepest issue is whether the two systems can exist together without trying to destroy each other. In short: is accomodation possible. What price will each side pay?

Outstanding Issues

The outstanding particular issues are of several sorts. Some are seemingly insolvable matters of fundamental principle. Others may be temporary and tactical. Others seem to be areas of danger which may give rise to conflict indefinitely.

The fundamental issues, territorial in character, seem insolvable today without the defeat of one side or the other.

The problem of Korea: must it continue to be divided into two hostile states, each protected by one camp, or can any plan of unification be worked out and then genuinely carried out by both sides? The two governments of Korea and both the Sino-Soviet bloc and America and

its allies profess to want unification. But actually each wants to determine the political character of all Korea. The U.N. plan for supervised election in north Korea to fill one hundred seats in the Republic of Korea's legislature is absolutely unrealistic. It would mean political surrender of the Sino-Soviet bloc which was not defeated in the Korean war. What the Sino-Soviet bloc proposes is equally unrealistic.

The Korean problem is strategic for both sides. To China and Russia, north Korea screens Manchuria and the Russian maritime provinces. They will not allow a hostile state right on the Yalu river and only a few miles from Vladivostok. For us south Korea screens Japan, while the army of the Republic of Korea (the strongest anti-Communist Asian military force) is an asset we will not give away.

There is a more fundamental question of principle involved for both sides. We assert the right of a people to choose its own form of government and its own officials. We are unwilling to abandon 20 million people to communism. We won't bargain people. Apparently the communists share our belief, in reverse. They will not relinquish their Koreans to what they regard as oppression of "feudalism and imperialism."

Under this situation it seems that Korea cannot be united for a long time to come. If it remains divided for many years, each side protected by its great-power patron, two nations with separate cultures might emerge. Possibly sociological developments will lead to the collapse of one or the other regime or to such success of one side that it would irresistibly draw the other to it. Remembering Hungary we may wonder whether Russia and China will permit north Korea to turn over.

Provided a renewed civil war does not reduce all Korea to ashes, there is a hope — but it is only a hope — that gradual easing of international tension — or the emergence of some presently unimagined new tension — will allow the unification and neutralization of Korea to be worked out under U.N. or other auspices. In our present mood of mutual international suspicion, however, the question how the terms of any settlement can be guaranteed to the satisfaction of both sides is perplexing. Each side to the present armistice terms in Korea believes the other has grossly violated the contract.

Korea is an example of a real issue which divides Communist China from the West. No solution is evident.

The case of divided Vietnam is similar, though the internal situation seems less stabilized. Because of space restrictions I shall not discuss it.

The international status of Taiwan is an issue which fundamentally divides the United States and Communist China. The off-shore islands problem is merely derivative from this larger issue. As seen by the

Communist leaders of China, Taiwan belongs to the country they rule. Historically it became a part of China even though it was detached, politically, for fifty years from 1895 to 1945. Taiwan is now governed by their arch-enemies, the Kuomintang Nationalists, whom they have been fighting in a bitter civil war for more than 30 years. Taiwan provides a refuge for the National Government which challenges the Chinese People's Government for the loyalty of all Chinese and for China's recognized place in the world. To make the situation even more intolerable, the arch-enemy of the whole Communist world, the United States – for them the “bastion of capitalism” – is establishing a military base on Taiwan only one hundred miles from the mainland and commanding the Formosa straits.

From the communist side there is no room for compromise on the fundamental point of control over Taiwan.

The other side sees no room for compromise either. To the Nationalists, continued control of Taiwan spells the life or death of their ideal. Without Taiwan they have no practical future. To the United States, Taiwan represents at a minimum an important link in the strategic chain: Alaska, the Aleutians, Japan, south Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. But it represents a moral issue too: faithfulness to an ally with whom we have a mutual defense treaty. It represents some number of Chinese – no one really knows how many – who reject communist totalitarianism. We are not in the business of abandoning people to communism. Taiwan sustains a non-communist Chinese state in being. It is a possible show-case for the evolution of a democracy in Asia with a high standard of living for all.

Can an issue so fundamentally divisive be reconciled? Not for the present. It is extremely unlikely that the two sides can be brought to an agreed “two Chinas” solution.

Yet the division is likely to persist so long as the United States continues its firm support to the Nationalists and Russia supports the Chinese Communists. In fact we both perpetuate the division. However, time will alter things. What is uncertain is where the altering will lead to. The aging and passing of the Nationalist leaders on the island and the “Taiwanization” of the mainlanders there are sure to bring about a significant political change. So will the passing of the first generation of Communist leaders. But will these processes heal the breach between the two parts of the divided nation on the mainland and on the island and lead towards unification? Will nationalism compel union? Or will two nations with distinct cultures emerge that could only be united by conquest? The two nation theory deserves some credence in view of the rapid and drastic ideological and social change occurring on the mainland.

The possession of Taiwan is an issue for which one can see no present solution short of the "solution" of war.

Tactical Issues

There is a second type of issue which may be subject to bargaining between Communist China and the West. These issues are more tactical. If agreements could be reached international tension might be reduced. I refer to such questions as membership in the United Nations for the Chinese People's Republic, recognition of the Peking government by the United States and other non-communist states, and the extent of trade and other contacts between the anti-communist world and Red China. The arguments do not hinge so much on matters of fundamental principle as whether continuance of the status quo or change would have the greater favorable or unfavorable results in forwarding more general objectives.

Some arguments for admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations are that this accords with reality, would help make the U.N. universal, that Red China is a necessary participant in the settlement of most international issues, and that to bring Red China under the charter of the U.N. and her conduct before the eyes of the world would have the effect of restraining her international conduct. Arguments against are that membership would add greatly to Red China's prestige and strengthen the Peking regime, dishearten Asian opponents of communism, seriously injure our ally, Nationalist China, and make it possible for Mao and his fellows to disrupt the U.N.

Similarly there are arguments for and against recognition of and trade and contacts with mainland China. Such matters can be bargained over, each side deciding what it concedes in exchange for what advantage. But there will have to be concessions from the People's Republic to match any made by the Free World — concessions which lead towards accommodation.

Issues of the third type are related to the growth of Communist China's power, its increasing influence in the world, and its efforts to enhance its own security and to advance the world communist movement. I can only list these emerging problems:

The status of Hongkong, Singapore, and Malaya. Will they or not be taken over by China through subversion or force?

The possible subversion or attraction of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia. Will they become satellites of China?

The future position of the overseas Chinese. Will they become the tool for China's economic and political dominance of southeast Asia?

The political future of Japan. Will it remain allied to the West, or at least independent, or will it be drawn into the Sino-Soviet orbit?

Chinese communist trade practices and other economic devices throughout southeast Asia. Will they create a new colonialism?

Will China provide the model for other Asian and African nations for economic and social development?

These are matters of grave concern to the non-communist world. Given China's "Middle Kingdom" tradition, Chinese nationalism and obsession for security, and the ideological commitment to spread the "world revolution" it is predictable that the leaders of mainland China will keep international tension at a high state.

They will try by almost any means to drive European and especially American influence out of Asia. They clearly see the United States trying to hem China in, to strengthen anti-communist governments, and to create hostile military power around her borders. We claim defense; they see offense.

China will try to help Asian and African countries "liberate" themselves; it will try to bring them what the Chinese leaders regard as the benefits of communism. Surely Americans who have devoted their lives to spreading the gospel of Christ throughout the world must understand that the communist system of belief also has its drive to save mankind.

Issues, or rather problems of the sort just listed, are not finally solvable. South and east Asia are likely to continue indefinitely to be an arena of conflict between China, the peoples and governments of the area, the Western world, and other emerging groups and forces.

Summing up the various issues into one general issue confronting the world: what system of relations shall exist between China and the other nations of the world? What sort of accommodation can be made — if any is possible short of war — between dynamic, expansive China and the rest of the world, particularly south and east Asia? Will both sides accommodate?

To turn now from issues to questions of policy, there would seem to be four directions, in one of which our policy might move: to war; withdrawal from the contest in Asia; continuation of the present attempt at containment; and search for accommodation. I shall not discuss the first two, though there are arguments for and advocates of each.

The third route, advocated by Taylor in the article I quoted at the beginning, attempts to hold Red China in check by making no concession — such as recognition, U.N. membership, or trade — which would add to its prestige or growth. We take no voluntary action that will strengthen our enemy or weaken any of its enemies. We seek to strengthen the lesser states east and south of China in the hope that they can maintain their independence. And, through military alliances, we prepare to retaliate in the event of serious provocation. This is

doubtless a much too simplified statement of the policy we currently follow. It is essentially a cold-war strategy. It has brought useful results such as giving new Asian countries time to start economic growth, welfare programs, and the creation of free political forms and institutions. It has given courage to non-communist Asian leaders. China cannot but try to break through such a constraining policy. At the cost of continuous international tension — which is to be expected in any case — this policy may indeed continue to hold China in check. We must expect that as China grows stronger each side will put more and more effort into the contest. We need to calculate whether such a policy leads more surely towards war or to some sort of peaceful, multi-national world.

The fourth possible direction is to search forthrightly for accommodation with Communist China. Before inspecting this path I might point out that there can be no *final* accommodation. The world is much too dynamic for any such possibility. We expect continued tension and conflict. Furthermore, we might search for accommodation only to find that China's leaders, in true Leninist style, are only searching for means to exploit each situation for the advance of the "world revolution." We try to accommodate and they try to advance and there is another problem. An attempt to find a basis for peaceful co-existence can be a dangerous art in itself: it may cause panic among shaky allies.

In spite of these perplexities I believe we should explore the road of attempting to live peacefully on the same planet with China. Can our conflicting ideologies be restrained and controlled under some system of international order?

What Relations Are Possible?

What sort of relations can the United States develop with Communist China (as well as with the Soviet bloc as a whole) which will maintain our own security and sustain the free nations, and will not, on the other hand, lead towards war. Again a caution: we dare not forget the implacable hostility of communist leaders towards the capitalist world. Any moves on our part may be misconstrued and almost surely will be exploited against us.

If we dare to explore the road of trying to live at peace with China we must determine to think creatively. We need to try to see and understand — even if we do not accept — the Chinese side of all issues. We cannot think exclusively in terms of U.S. national interests, though we must never forget them. We have to ask ourselves: how can relations be improved? not just: how can Red China be blocked?

We should strive for greater contact in order to dispel our own ignorance about China and to provide greater realism in our thinking. There is a chance that greater contact will influence China's leaders, or

perhaps another generation of leaders, to a less hostile policy. But we cannot be very sure of the results. Greater contact may, in fact, lead to a hardening of our attitude and position towards China. The Chinese campaign of indoctrinating the people with hatred for America might, when fully known here, give fuel to a counter campaign of hate for China.

In any case contact will have to proceed slowly because of inflamed sensitivities on both sides. We and the Chinese are likely to see spies and subversives in every visitor. Unpleasant incidents are inevitable. Yet there are steps which could be taken now. Newsmen could be admitted to China tomorrow if we would reciprocate on a basis of equality. Chinese and Americans could meet in scientific and cultural gatherings where the purpose is exchange of knowledge and solution of problems, not competition. The United States is just beginning to open the door to delegates from mainland China to attend international meetings here. Chinese and American Christian leaders could meet each other in third countries. This they certainly should do. Chinese and American scholars ought to be allowed to study in the other country. Here, however, the spy problem — or mania! — is a serious difficulty. Exploring this policy, we should try to move step by step toward greater and greater contact between our two societies.

This brings us to the problems of U.N. membership and diplomatic recognition. Membership for the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations seems likely within a few years, provided China does not become involved in war first. The voting trend is moving slowly towards recognition of the credentials of the People's Republic. We can continue to fight this, and possibly the tide can be reversed. If not, however, we may have to adjust to it. Admission of Red China is certain to cause discouragement among the anti-communist states and leaders of Asia, and will add greatly to Communist China's prestige. It would be a terrible blow to the Nationalists. This presents a general problem of policy: how to prepare ourselves and our allies for this event if it seems likely to occur. To prepare is certainly not beyond our capacity.

The knotty question is the status of Nationalist China — the Republic of China — in the U.N. It is usually assumed that if the Chinese People's Republic is accorded China's seats in the U.N., the present holder must relinquish them. Red China comes in; Blue China goes out. This is certainly so for the permanent seat in the Security Council. But what of the other agencies? The Republic of China already has its seats. Cannot the People's Republic be added as a new State? This is, of course, the "two Chinas" theory, which both sides reject. Need the world reject it too.

Is it not possible for the leaders of the U.N. to work out an arrangement whereby Nationalist China continues to be a member after the

People's Republic is admitted? This should receive serious discussion among our allies and the neutral states. From our point of view it would be much better than admission of Red China and expulsion of the Nationalists. If the Soviet bloc refuses to consider such a scheme — or if Nationalist China refuses — the onus will be on the stubborn ones. At present it seems unlikely that either state would consent to such a plan.

Even if both did, the problem is not simple, however. Aside from the legal issues of the U.N. charter, there are closely related international political issues: the status of divided Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. Would the world consent to double representation for each of them in the U.N.? Perhaps the theory should be developed that when, in fact, there are divided states with separate territory and functioning governments, each should have seats in the U.N. If the parts are later united, the seats will then be merged.

American recognition of the People's Republic of China would seem an obvious step toward improving relations. Yet recognition is a two-way process. There is no assurance that the People's Republic is ready to recognize the United States. The process of mutual diplomatic recognition has not been completed between the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China more than eight years after the British made the first overtures. The leaders in Peking have seemed to take satisfaction in treating British representatives as petitioners. From their point of view, however, Britain's participation in the U.N. intervention in Korea and Britain's regular support of the U.S. position regarding China's seats in the U.N., leaves much to be desired. If our British friends have found the recognition problem difficult we should expect it to be much more thorny.

The nub of the problem is again Nationalist China. We recognize the National Government and have recently entered into a mutual defense treaty with it. We are allies. So long as it is a viable political entity in control of a part of China we have an obligation to support it. Unless we are willing to recognize two Chinese governments simultaneously — and can persuade them both to accept the arrangement — we have to choose one or the other. To abandon Nationalist China in the hopes thereby of improving relations with Communist China would be morally indefensible and quite unrealistic in terms of our own present security arrangements.

The recognition problem is one which can be postponed and it would seem wise for America to postpone it.

Can we reduce military tension? Our government can quietly discourage the Nationalist Chinese military leaders, the South Korean leaders and our own officials from provocative acts and statements. This is already being done, but the process of reducing military tension is a

two-sided operation. It was Communist China which twice raised military tension, in the spring of 1955 and again in the summer of 1958, over the off-shore islands. Even if Chiang could be persuaded to give the islands to Peking this would only remove a local issue without touching the fundamental problem of two Chinese parties in civil war. Will the Chinese Communist leaders make substantial concessions to reduce tension, or do they expect to move only from conquest to conquest?

Really to reduce military tension in the China area means removing this problem of Chinese civil war. In practical terms I can only envision two alternatives in American policy. One — which I do not advocate — would be our gradual abandonment of Nationalist China, progressively reducing our financial, military and moral support until its government collapses or until sociological changes on Taiwan make possible an accommodation of the people with Peking and a relatively peaceful take over. The other is to continue our support of Nationalist China in all ways except the encouragement of its leaders' aspiration to reconquer the mainland, in the hope that over the years two separate Chinas will emerge each having abandoned as practical policy the ideal of conquering the other.

Are there other approaches we can take toward mainland China which might lead to better relations without weakening the Free World? Can we not change the tone of public discourse about China? What if our officials — the Secretary of State and the President — occasionally acknowledged the material accomplishments of the People's Republic of China? Suppose they indicated either publicly or through private channels that our government would welcome easing of tensions. (Not knowing anything of the tone and content of the repeated meetings at Geneva between the American and Chinese ambassadors, I do not know whether such approaches have been tried.) Suppose the Voice of America ceased its hostile propaganda for a trial period, say for six months. Suppose we noticed those elements in our behavior that injure the pride of China's leaders and tried, where possible, to remove these injuries. (A case in point was when an agreement was ostensibly being worked out to allow qualified American reporters to visit China. It appears to me that the State Department effectively upset the agreement by inserting in its public announcement an insulting paragraph to the effect that China must not expect reciprocity. No newsmen from Red China could visit the United States. China naturally refused to admit our newsmen. Had there been the intention to improve relations would such an insult have been offered?) What might develop if we opened the avenues of trade between our two countries? In short, if we took some positive steps toward bettering relations, might anything useful come of it. It may be naive to assume so, but unless the effort be seriously made we can never be sure.

The dilemma in the situation is that our fundamental policy is to strengthen the Free World and to oppose the spread of communism. This makes simultaneous attempts at friendly international intercourse most difficult. But without weakening our defenses can we not develop a less negative and less belligerent policy towards China? Is there nothing short of the harshest sort of hostility?

The burden of my discussion has been to emphasize the great difficulties in the international political sphere that surround any effort to achieve peaceful relations with Communist China. The destinies of nations in south and east Asia are involved in whatever policy decisions are made (unless we subscribe to some theory of historical inevitability in the destiny of nations). The strength of the Free World and the survival of our cherished democratic values and institutions are at stake in the present struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. We must continue to work hard in all peaceful ways to strengthen the Free World and the United Nations. There can be no final solution of our problems with dynamic and aggressive China, only steps towards an accommodation.

But no steps towards more peaceful relations between America and mainland China can occur without a fundamental policy decision to try to achieve such relations. Do we dare to try? I believe we should explore this road. To do so requires imagination, perseverance, and courage. But peaceful relations will depend not only upon American intentions and actions. They will depend also on the intentions and actions of Chinese leaders whose minds are steeped in Marx and Lenin. "We both have to learn to live on the same planet."

O. Frederick Nolde

O. Frederick Nolde informally outlined a functional approach to the problem giving attention to (1) obstacles to a change of United States policy; (2) reasons why continuance of the present policy is impossible, and (3) steps which would be of assistance in moving toward a solution. Subsequently, these views were briefly summarized as follows:

It is an amazing fact that, until the emergency of the recent crisis in the Formosa Straits, public opinion in this country was neither critical nor vocal. The situation has been different in Christian opinion outside the United States. For years our colleagues abroad have found it difficult to understand the United States' position. There has recently been evidence of the tendency on the part of Christian groups in some countries to go so far as to oppose any governmental policy which supports the U.S. present stand on China. This point of view seems prompted by the belief (1) that the continued isolation of over 600 million people from the rest of the world is artificial and unhealthy; and (2) that progress in relieving world tensions, particularly progress on the cessation of testing and on disarmament, requires that the government in power on the mainland of China – currently the People's Republic – be formally represented in intergovernmental organs. I venture to say that the following steps would command widespread support: (1) with the relaxation of military action, measures should be taken to see to it that the off-shore islands do not in fact constitute a thorn in the side of peace – measures involving successively demilitarization, neutralization, and determination of juridical status; (2) the early determination of the juridical status of Formosa, as well as the applicability of the principle of self-determination to the people of Formosa; (3) the prompt determination, by the United States, under what conditions it would support accreditation of representatives of the People's Republic of China in the U.N. – with the understanding that, just as the Nationalist Government has repudiated the use of force to recapture the mainland, so the People's Republic should repudiate the use of force to gain Formosa.

The Issues in Church Relationships

M. Searle Bates

The following statement, taking into account the known changes in the Chinese nation and society under the Communist regime, and considering the life of the churches of China in so far as we understand it, seeks to focus attention upon the possibilities of developing relationships between those churches and ourselves in the churches of Europe and North America, particularly those of the United States.

The ecumenical position is assumed — namely, that the Church includes all who have faith in Christ; and that, as members of the Body of Christ, all Christians are, in normative truth, to be in living and mutually helpful relations with each other. Conversely, severance or stricture of such relations is, in normative truth, mutilation or disease, to be remedied if possible. The churches and Christians of China need the sharing, supplementing, strengthening and challenging or corrective fellowship of churches outside China. The churches of the United States have a similar general need, which comprehends the fellowship of the churches in China and — specifically — requires adequate understanding of the human and Christian experience of Chinese brethren in these unprecedented years, an experience which might lead us to new truth in our own life and in our relations with Christians of still other countries of Asia and elsewhere.

Among the many Christian Americans who desire the best possible relations with the churches of China which circumstances permit, two inter-related queries arise or should arise: (1) What visible relations have actually existed during recent years? What relations appear now or in the foreseeable future to be materially possible? (2) What relations appear to be spiritually and psychologically possible and desirable in a Christian sense, and how may they soundly be fostered? No individual or group can presume to give confident and satisfying answers to these questions. But we must attempt to draw together some of the facts and the considerations which look toward the best answers we can make.

Readers of the *China Bulletin* and those who have had the papers and guidance of such of our colleagues as Drs. Jones, Merwin, and Price are basically prepared, although they may not have organized in focus upon our present issues the data and ideas available. Others may need here a combination of brief factual report with some elements of interpretation.

With the exception of the Yenching and Nanking journals intended for pastors and published occasionally, we now know of only one Christian paper that has survived, the familiar *T'ien Feng*, which is

produced by the Three-Self Reform Committee. It has generally reached us, whether promptly or slowly, and sometimes by devious courses. This paper supplies the official line of appropriate governmental and organizational statements, including declarations by the Reform Committee, by editors, by prominent Christians; plus news of a sort to stimulate and to admonish the readers to perform good works and to shun evil as defined by the purposes of the Committee. *T'ien Feng* provides some concrete and local news of church activities, frequently leaving us puzzled as to whether these items are representative, or whether they are chosen because of their exceptional character and homiletic utility.

It seems to us that no organization has the means, the will, and the freedom to provide reasonably full reporting of the ordinary life of the churches, their problems, and their aims — to say nothing of significant discussion on theological, ecclesiastical, ethical, and social issues. However, we must recognize that in the totalitarian situation the present means of expression may be more nearly adequate to the felt wants of church leaders than we can readily understand. General acceptance of a revolutionary system as needed, ultimately beneficial, and inevitable as climate, carries a considerable renunciation of what the system rigorously forbids as injurious to the people. In sum, the Christian means of information within China and without are sadly meager. The outflow of fugitives has dwindled to a low level, and is selectively controlled. The information that it brings is intermittent and usually personal or strictly local in character. To the best of our knowledge, the movement of Christian books and journals into China, though undertaken with care and persistence by appropriate persons in Britain, Europe, and Hongkong, has been very slight and irregular.

The number of Christian deputations, Christian members of other deputations, and individual Christian visitors going from Europe, Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, India, Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, is considerable — especially in the years 1955 to 1957. In the opposite direction, a number of Christian Chinese have visited other countries as members of deputations sent by the authorities for cultural and political purposes, or as Christian groups going to Europe, Britain, or India, in some cases meeting more or less formally with committees of world bodies such as the World's Student Christian Federation, the World's YMCA, or the World Council of Churches. Such contacts have been better than none, and they certainly have aided in maintaining or renewing for some few individuals a living sense of *persons* over the frontier. Also, for some they have provided a sense of the difficult realities limiting the range and depth of present relationships. The total interchange of information and the degree of understanding achieved have been disappointingly slight.

Comparatively few centers and persons in China have been accessible, and the Chinese who have spoken sound much like *T'ien Feng*. This near-uniformity of statement is explicable in two concomitant terms: (1) the massive indoctrination and the conforming response to a totalitarian revolution intensely dynamic and coercive; (2) the selection, instruction, and control of persons who are to have significant relations with foreigners. On the other hand, the conversations have brought hardly a mite of understanding as to the day-to-day problems of ordinary pastors and layfolk, or as to the deeper concerns of thoughtful Christian leaders and their innermost interpretations of the spiritual and institutional condition of the churches after a decade of severe experience. Moreover, we must reckon with the many invitations, some of them most carefully given by Asians, which have not been accepted, even after favorable preliminaries, such as: Lambeth, the East Asia Christian Conference at Prapat, the Ghana Assembly of the International Missionary Council, Canada, varied meetings of the World Council of Churches. Do these negatives come by direct governmental decision, by the burdens and embarrassments of leaders, by inability to secure from Chinese sources funds for travel, or by unknowns internal to the Chinese situation?

Inadequacy of Information

In an effort to understand the paucity of information and the inhibitions upon free intercourse, we may well attend to a few points of difficulty. Breaks with the past have harsh: repudiation of much of the traditional culture of China, and also of the society and thought in which today's men were formed — say 1910 to 1940 or 1945; rejection of the Chinese Christian past; severing of ecumenical and of denominational ties overseas. Many individual Christians have relatives, close friends, old personal associations now largely or completely cut off in Hongkong, Taiwan, or farther afield. The sense of isolation for the individual and for the small Christian minority in a hostile totalitarianism must be a potent, though perhaps unstable impulsion to enter as heartily as may be, or at the very least to conform protectively to the one great human force of life — the regime.

Again, though the truth is hidden, we seem to sense distressful poverty and straitened church life. Economic and other pressures drive pastors into general occupations, which leave little time and strength for the church. The infrequency of large-scale church assemblies and conferences and the paucity of publications may be due to lack of funds as much as to the lack of time or of official permission. The "nationalization of housing", the closing and diversion to other uses of many rural churches during land reform or in the shifts of collectivization and redistribution of labor, the current drive for "people's communes", all suggest, however vaguely, a loss of church property and of parishioners' disposable income which may be telling pervasively and heavily against effective church life.

Formally cheerful statements come out from the Nanking Theological Seminary, which seems to be the largest of the few remaining training institutions of fair educational level. Yet, according to one reckoning, the most favorable estimate possible would show for the whole country one-third as many ministerial students as ten years ago. The loss of Christian hospitals, colleges, and middle schools must count grievously in the critical effort among young people, and in the dispersion and weakening of influence of many of the most useful laymen. Again, it is ominous that we read and hear so little of "Religious Education", once so important in the program of the National Christian Council, in publications, and in leadership training. Here, as in the general field of Christian literature and publishing, how much of the evident decline is due to lack of funds for direct operation or for support of key personnel, how much to some form of political restriction through quiet control of paper or otherwise, in a society that has no room for voluntary publication or for voluntary organization of children and youth, is not known to us.

It is hard to think and to speak about another aspect of the situation. The original period of self-criticism and confession which was often involved with denunciation of others for crimes of association with imperialism, for failure to welcome the values of the revolution, and the like, has been followed at intervals right up into 1958 by attacks of one Christian or group of Christians upon others. Some of these accusations have been distorted or even manufactured by manipulators, but many have been actual — made under inhuman pressures and mass suggestion, often with the intent to protect church or family or self against grievous menace or injustice. We dare not judge from without. But the result is division, suspicion, and distrust that may be isolating and intimidating in distant reaches of space and time.

We who live in a relatively free society can scarcely feel by imagination the totality of omnipresent control which is exercised by the Communist police-state with employment, housing, food completely in its hands. Rare and marginal exceptions granted, life is possible only by acceptance of the regime and adaptation to its methods, its ideas. For churches and pastors there are also specific police controls and the over-all direction of the Bureau of Religious Affairs — which, on the national scale, is commonly exercised through the Three-Self Reform Committee. (The National Christian Council, with its traditions of Christian voluntarism, is displaced and atrophied, probably by high policy as well as by privation of resources.) Uniformity in the utterance of standard formulas, whether induced by control-conformity or by flooding indoctrination, or both, is pathetically illustrated in the close similarities and even the phrase-for-phrase identities, of statements published as from Muslim and Buddhist leaders with those coming as from Christian leaders. The same force is dominating, the same force is reporting,

in all cases, what are or purport to be the political and social attitudes of the religious leaders.

Can There Be A Renewal Of Communications?

What do we do? At once we must recognize two opposite views within our own constituency and, in variant forms, outside it. Some feel that any sort of contact now with churches in China is futile or definitely injurious. Persons holding this view often consider the communist revolution to be thoroughly evil and bound to fail; hence, friendly contact of any sort merely gives aid and comfort to an enemy who will pervert and exploit the good intentions of the innocent, and discourages those within and without China who oppose communism and hope for the failure of the regime. A variant outlook is that the only accessible persons are those selected on political grounds, who can speak or desire to speak merely the official line; while faithful Christians are to be found only among the obscure and recessive, who could, even if they had the material opportunities, talk freely to outside friends only at acute peril to themselves and their immediate brethren. This outlook condemns the contacts thus far possible, as traitorous to the true church and supporting the claims of the false.

The contrary view would rush forward in all possible invitations, visits, and communications, assuming that every attempt to increase contacts is meritorious and beneficial in a Christian sense, regardless of circumstance. Some would add that multiplication of contacts is urgently necessary in order to lessen the danger of war; and at times this has had a verbal equivalent in the communist program of conferences in the name of peace, and cultural exchanges undertaken in similar terms.

We believe that neither of these extreme attitudes is sound, but we do not intend to belabor them before those who have shared in the prior statements and discussions of this Consultation. We favor contacts, with due regard to the total setting, to the difficult position of our Chinese Christian brethren, and to the importance of tact and timing. We now suggest some preparatory considerations.

Ideally, there should be mutuality of purpose, approach, and method. Each party — and we are primarily responsible for our own attitudes — should be readied to listen and to learn, as well as to speak the truth in love, out of our own Christian and general experience and understanding. This requires, given the present situation, a Christian combination of alert, sensitive expectancy for more of good result than a realist can expect, with patient faith through long and repeated discouragement. Should there be thoughtful preliminary exchanges as to the explicit objectives and the appropriate arrangements and procedures for any sort of consultation? Or would the attempt at such exchanges simply block the way to face-to-face conferences that might, through confrontation of persons, accomplish something more significant than the preparatory

approach could set up? In any case, some one should be preparing a simple documentation of the attitudes of American churches and their missionary agencies as shown in various statements to their own constituencies from 1948 to the present. Because of the way the communist press has exploited various hostile declarations by certain prominent individuals and by the Roman Catholic authorities, it is important that constant love, prayer, and Christian concern should also be known. Perhaps friends in other countries may need to vouch for our Christian integrity.

Christians on this side should realize that in a gross, collective sense, American opinion has demanded the impossible from our Chinese brethren. Many of us have assumed that only a hostile, nonconforming attitude toward the communist system is compatible with Christian faith and with the integrity of an individual Christian or of the Church. In very truth, does this assumption comport with actuality in contemporary China? Hostile nonconformity would require an alienation from society close to suicide, which is neither among the classic Christian virtues nor among live human options for more than a tragic few. But if the Christians conform, as in the large they must and do conform, many outsiders assume in varying degrees of theoretical and practical rigor that these Chinese have apostasized. To an extent that we can never comprehend unless some day we live utterly at the mercy of a communist regime and its massive indoctrination, patriotism, social duty, conscience, are all identified with "the people's government"; and refusal to join heartily in the production of food, the advancement of health, the extension of education, in the total effort of "the people" is treason, selfishness of the most completely anti-social quality, the conduct of an animal beneath the floor of human morality. Just what do we want or expect of Chinese Christians? Indeed, we need and hope some day to learn how some faithful people, in the strength of the Holy Spirit, have discovered a way of Christian life in the collective society so oppressive and impossible to our other-conditioned minds. Our descendants may need such examples, even if we do not, whether in the advance of communist organization or in a technocratic America collectivized by mass economy, mass communications, mass education, mass amusements.

Again, we must be prepared to learn that in fact and still more in the information current within China, most of the barriers of separation are attributable to wrongful attitudes and acts on our own part or on the part of our Government. Dulles, Stuart, some of the Committee of One Million, are accounted spokesmen of Christianity in statements and policies utterly intolerable to the tide of Chinese feelings in these years. Should we try to leave political issues to one side, and speak in a close channel of church interests? It is unlikely that questions of recognition, of exclusion from the United Nations, of the Korean fighting and germ

warfare (these last put to our charge by every one in China, so far as we know) could or should be avoided; and they probably would be raised at the outset as tests of good faith and Christian decency. Must there be suspicion and jangling over the past, which would prevent a new start? But can there be a fresh start without patient clearance of the past? We wish merely to suggest that renewal of contacts is no tourist enterprise. Moreover, we must not be impatient if Christian experience is bound in political covers.

Some westerners contend that the main problem is on the American side, and that no general improvement is possible until our part is well under way. Others feel that significant advance in relations of Chinese Christians with other Asian Christians and with ecumenical bodies must precede betterment of relations with Americans. A variant of this view points to ecumenical or at least to multilateral meetings, as more favorable than bilateral confrontations in such delicate relationships. Chinese hostility toward anything that carries the tradition and vocabulary of missions seems to rule out the International Missionary Council, and also the participation of mission boards and societies in the resumption of relationships. The World Council of Churches was thoroughly rejected because of the 1950 declaration on collective defence for South Korea, and has been severely criticized on other grounds, such as its alleged subversive activity in Hungary in 1956.

All in all, we should rejoice in contacts of Chinese with churches and Christians of other countries and with world bodies. For ourselves, we should carefully seek opportunities to move forward, with appropriate sensitiveness at each moment to the situation and attitudes of Chinese Christians, on threefold lines of individual communication with individuals, church group with church group, interdenominational group with interdenominational group. But we must realize that a good many feelers and initiatives have already been put forth on each of these three lines, with active or passive refusals, or negative and trivial results, even in years more likely than 1958 and prospective 1959. Probably we need to be particularly cautious, as well as alert to possible opportunities as they might develop in this present period of increased pressure against the churches and not a few of their leaders.

It is well at this point to remind ourselves of the extent and quality of the differing views of prior and shared Christian experience, as they appear to hold sway today in China. The important statement by Kiang Wen-han (*T'ien Feng* February 10, 1958) declared that "the schools and hospitals opened by mission boards and other small favors dispensed by the missionaries all had the effect only of enslaving, stupefying and dividing the Chinese people. The one general purpose in it all was to keep the people permanently in the position of subjection and slavery, where they could never receive the benefits of a free and independent life." Aware of problems in this sweeping interpretation, the article

proceeds: "We can see that Western mission boards seeing that the people were opposed to imperialism used the independent church movement to deceive the people."

The *T'ien Feng* editorial of March 3, 1958, in words worth pondering phrase by phrase, concluded thus; "A resolute dissociation of our Christian religion from imperialism and a sharp line of demarcation between our churches and the imperialist enemy is not only agreeable to our Christian faith but also beneficial to our Church . . . As to opportunities for friendly interchange of thoughts and mutual edification in the tasks of the Church and of world peace among Christians of different countries, we certainly regard them as helpful to the strengthening of the witness of our Church and, therefore, heartily welcome them." This latter sentence in detail seems encouraging, though it must be read in the light of communist political influences within and without China. Kiang Wen-han also complained that the slogans "world church" and "world unity" are used to get Christians in colonial and semi-colonial situations to be traitors to their own country and be obedient to American imperialism while they mouth such claims as "Christ is the hope of the world." Billy Graham and fundamentalists are included in the sweeping charges of imperialist and non-Christian attitudes, lest any one should feel that the attack is specifically upon the ecumenical fellowship in the narrower sense of that term. It is also noteworthy that Dr. Mackay's appeal in 1956 for an exchange of deputations was tossed into the pit on the grounds that Poteat and others who seconded it openly admitted political motivations — getting into touch with American-trained Chinese, separating China from Russia, and the like. At the very least, these statements suggest that severe pressure was felt by prominent Christians, and that they needed afresh in 1958 to assert drastic separation from western churches.

Within our own country and in Taiwan, the attitudes expressed in the foregoing exploration of relationships churches to churches, will be violently opposed by various types of men for various qualities of reasons, some of them contradictory to each other. Often this opposition will not read carefully or wish to understand the qualifications with which we state our desire for contact. Also, there may be governmental objection to some forms or instances of contacts at some times, though probably anything that a considerable body of responsible churchmen can agree upon as right and wise could gain its opportunity. From difficulties of these sorts we must not shrink if and when we have concluded that action ought to be undertaken.

Moreover, we must see this particular problem in the larger perspective. Are we, as American Christians, sufficiently mature to accept the fact that God's world is predominantly non-Christian and even anti-Christian, as well as the fact that it is certainly not white, and is very far from being American in political and social structure? In that world we live.

